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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

CaseNo.950324-CA

v.
JEFFERY LYNN CAMPBELL,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his jury convictions for possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-378(l)(a)(iv) (1995); possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-2(a)(ii) (1995);1 possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1981); assault, a class B

1

Through apparent administrative oversight, Counts One and Two in the Information
erroneously cited subsection (ii), under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a), instead of subsection
(iv). This error was not repeated injury instructions (R. 54-57), and the jury convicted Appellant
of "Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine as charged
in Count I of the Information", and of "Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, a lesser
included offense within that charged in Count II of the Information" (R. 66,67); SSS. Utah Code
Ann. §§58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(2)(a)(l). Appellant's failure to challenge the Information
at trial waived any appellate issue. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1) and (d). Appellant was on
adequate notice of the offenses in any event Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b); sg£ State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d
1208,1213-15 (Utah 1985), esUAsmssL 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260,
262 (Utah 1985), cert.denied. 484 U.S. 1044 (1988).

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-5-102(1) and 77-36-1 (1995); and
unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code. Ann. §§76-5-304
and 77-36-1 (1973; 1995) (R. 66-68). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was the evidence of prior bad acts admissible under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence? If not, was admission of the evidence prejudicial error?
2. Was trial defense counsel ineffective?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,935-39 (Utah 1994), the supreme court began to
refine its articulation of the standards for reviewing trial court rulings. The trial court has
"a good deal of discretion" to admit evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). Pena.
869 P.2d at 938 ("[o]ther rulings on the admission of evidence entail a good deal of
discretion") (dicta). See also State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983); United
States v.Patterson. 20 F.3d 809, 813 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 128 (1994). The
appellate courts accord trial courts considerable freedom to admit or exclude evidence
under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Esna, 689 P.2d at 937-38 (dicta). See also State v.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,239-40 (Utah 1992). This Court will reverse an evidentiary
ruling under rule 403 only if the trial court's decision was "beyond the limits of
reasonability." State v. Tavlor. 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991); Hamilton. 827 P.2d
2

232,240 (Utah 1992). If the Court determines the evidence was inadmissible under rule
404(b) or rule 403, then it must determine whether admission was prejudicial error. State
v. O'NeiL 848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App. 1993); see also State v, Qlsen, 869 P.2d 1004,
1010 (Utah App. 1994). Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal of a conviction
only where this Court concludes there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings." O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 699 (quoting Hamilton, 827 P.2d at
240 (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989))).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 404(a):
Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion.
Utah R. Evid 404(b):
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an Information with Count One, Possession of a
Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) with Intent to Distribute, a second degree
3

felony; Count Two, Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana) with Intent to
Distribute, a second degree felony; Count Three, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor; Count Four, Assault, a class B misdemeanor; and Count Five,
Unlawful Detention, a class B misdemeanor.
In a one-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute (Count One), possession of drug
paraphernalia (Count Three), assault (Count Four), and unlawful detention (Count Five).
Under Count Two, defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana).
Defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on Count One;
to concurrent terms of six months in the Washington County Jail on Counts Two through
Four; and to consecutive terms of six months in the Washington County Jail on Counts
Four and Five.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background. The incidents giving rise to all charges occurred on October 25,
1995. Prior to that date, defendant and Teri LaConti had been boyfriend and girlfriend for
about a year and a half (R. 245,285,399). Their relationship was stormy. They had been
living together in Ogden, Utah, until Teri called a girlfriend to drive her back to St.
George, Utah (R. 401). Later, after defendant spoke with her, defendant went to St.
George and picked her up (R. 401).
4

During the week prior to October 25,1994, the two lived out of a car, and then
stayed at a motel for a couple of nights (R. 246-47,399-400). During that week, Ten saw
defendant use illegal drugs (R. 255). A couple of days before the incidents, Teri herself
used methamphetamine which defendant provided (R. 283-84,312).

Possessipn 9f Metfomph<tomin<? with Intent to Distribute, Possession <?f
Maqjuana. Possession of Paraphernalia. On October 25,1994, defendant told Teri he
was going to sell drugs (marijuana and "speed") to afriendnamed Mary Ann (R. 257-59).
Later, defendant left the motel room and returned with the drugs (R. 286, 315). Teri
observed defendant weigh methamphetamine ("speed") on a set of scales, and put it in
"bindles" to sell (R. 255-56,259,315). She also saw defendant writing in a little black
notebook while he was "weighing out his stuff' (R. 279-80). Defendant put the baggies
of marijuana and "bindles" of methamphetamine in his pockets, and that is where Teri
last saw them (R. 438).
When defendant was arrested, the arresting officer seized a set of scales (State's
Ex. 9), "bindles" of methamphetamine (State's Exs. 6-7), and two baggies of marijuana
(State's Exs. 1-2) from under the driver's seat of the car defendant was driving (R. 36268,372-73; R. 323-330,336; 345-46). A small black notebook (State's Ex. 3), identified
by the arresting officer as an "owe sheet" (defendant's "books

to keep track of money

owed and money paid") was seized from defendant's back pants pocket, and contained
the name "Mary Ann" (R. 368,371).
5

At trial, Teri identified the seized items, i.e., the scales, the bindles, and the
baggies of marijuana, as those defendant had used or prepared in the motel room (R. 259
264,274-75). Teri also identified the little black book as defendant's record "[o]f what
people owe him for his dope"(R. 278-80).
Unlawful Detention, Assault, While they were at the motel on the day of the
incident, Teri testified defendant "was acting really weird" (R. 248-49). Among other
things, he told her, "After today, you'll feel no more pain. You stay with me just one
more day" (R. 257). She attributed defendant's behavior to his use of drugs (R. 256).
She had observed drugs affect defendant's behavior on prior occasions, and that is why
she was "scared for [her] life" (R. 256-57,248-49,285,317). Although defendant left
their motel room twice, Teri did not feel free to walk away from the motel, so she told
him she wanted to go to Albertson's on the way to Mary Ann's to get some aspirin for a
toothache. She did not have a toothache (R. 251,264,286), but wanted to get around
people so she could get away from defendant or call someone because she felt "he was
going to hurt [her]" (R. 250-51).
After they drove to Albertson's, Teri said to defendant, "I'll go in" (R. 264).
Defendant refused, and went with her, holding her arm "real tight" (R. 265). When they
got inside the store, Teri "tried to get away. I tried to get him off me, to let me - make
his arm go off me. And he wouldn't. The more I fought, the tighter he would grab me
and pull me into him" (R. 266). Teri was 5f 4M tall and weighed 100-115 pounds, and
6

defendant was a "tall man" (R. 202) who weighed between 160 and 170 pounds (R. 312).
Somehow, Teri got free and ran to a phone at the courtesy stand where she tried to call a
girlfriend; however, herfriendwas not home, and defendant hung up the phone and
dragged her out of the store (R. 267-68,299-300). Teri yelled, "Leave me alone. I don't
want to go with you" (R. 268,297). Although Teri was trying to draw attention to herself
and people were looking at them, nobody responded (R. 293-94,301). When they got
back to the car, Teri screamed (R. 268). When defendant shoved her in the car several
times and went around to the driver's side, Teri got out of the car (R. 269). Defendant
"was justfreaky,"and tried to break the handle off her door. I&
Mr. and Mrs. Young were just getting out of their car when they heard Teri
scream, "Leave me alone"(R. 201-202,227). They saw her struggling with a man who
was trying to push her into a car (R. 202-208,228). Mrs. Young saw Teri break free and
run to thefrontof the store, so she ran toward her to see if Teri was okay (R. 208-09).
When Mrs. Young asked what she could do, Teri said, "Call 911" (R. 210). Mr. Young
did, and Teri ran into the store (R. 211,228).
Jeremy Gabrielson was bagging groceries a few feet from the courtesy booth when
Teri "ran into the store. And she seemed like she was hysterical. And she asked me to
call 911 for her. And she said her boyfriend had attacked her and tried to kidnap her. So
I called 911. After the operator came on, I gave the phone to her

7

" (R 240).

Ten told the 911 dispatcher her name and defendant's name, and explained that he
was trying to kill her, that he had drugs, and that she needed help (R. 271). She also
described defendant's car (R. 276).
Officer Michael Applegate identified the car described by the 911 dispatcher as
having left the scene of a domestic dispute at Albertson's. Officer Applegate pulled it
over, searched it, and found the drugs and paraphernalia already described, and arrested
defendant who was the car's driver and sole occupant (R. 358-73).
At trial, Teri identified two photos (State's Ex. 13) showing bruises on her arms
taken in the Albertson's parking lot the day of the incident (R. 280-81). She testified that
the bruises were caused by defendant holding her so tight. Id.
Defendant's testimony. Defendant's testimony differed substantially from the
State's evidence. He denied knowing of drugs in his motel room (R. 404). He testified
that, on the day of the incident, Teri "was just real scared or just paranoid or something,"
and he thought she was having a nervous breakdown or, "she had done quite a bit of her
drugs." Li!
2

When Mrs. Young entered the store, Teri was on the telephone and asked Mrs.
Young to wait outside and to get her when the police arrived (R. 212). Although Teri
appearedfrightened,Mrs. Young did not suspect that she was under the influence of
either alcohol or drugs (R. 213-15). Officer Garen Brecke, who responded to Albertson's
and interviewed Teri and other witnesses, testified that, although Teri was initially
"hysterical" and "very nervous," he was able to calm her down and take her statement (R.
184, 193-96). In Officer Brecke's opinion, Teri was not under the influence of alcohol or
drugs (R. 197-98). He attributed her earlier agitated behavior as consistent with the
events she and other witnesses had described (R. 199).

8

Defendant testified they walked in Albertson's "pretty much - let's see - 1 do
believe it was hand-in-hand" (R. 405). Defendant testified that he did not touch her when
they left the store until after she got out of the car, so he put his arms around her waist to
comfort her, leaned against the car, and talked to her, asking if she wanted to go to the
hospital "because she was just going off for no reason" (R. 406,416-17). When she said,
"Get away from me," he let her go, got in the car, and drove away. LL
Although he had had the car he was drivingfromthe owners for a month,
defendant testified that some of the items still in the car belonged to the owners (R. 411).3
Defendant also denied knowing the drugs were under his seat, or that he arranged to
provide drugs to Mary Ann (R. 422,423-24). He specifically denied that the drugs found
in the car belonged to him. I&
Although he testified to seeing "bindles" in his past, defendant denied ever seeing
the "bindles" introduced in his case. Id* (State's Exs. 6-7). Defendant also denied being
familiar with the scales (R. 417-18; State's Ex. 9), and testified that the black book was
Teri's which she brought back from California (R. 418; State's Ex. 3). According to
defendant, "she stated that her dad let her have it or something like that. And so she sort
of gave it to me, and so we both used it and left it in the car." LLi Defendant denied
3

Teri testified on rebuttal that the items in the car belonged only to defendant or
herself (R. 437).
4

As noted above, Officer Applegate testified he found the book in defendant's
back pocket (R. 368).
9

being aware at the time that Teri had used methamphetamine a couple of days before the
incident, and denied that he had provided it to her, although he testified her actions were
consistent with previous occasions when she had used the drug (R. 421,419).
Defendant denied making any threatening statements to Teri on the day of the
incident, and specifically denied telling her, "After today, you won't feel any more pain"
(R. 414-15). He denied knowing what "set her off' at Albertson's (R. 415). He denied
assaulting her at Albertson's (R. 416). He testified he did not recall ever restraining her
against her will (R. 417).
Defendant denied causing Teri's bruises, and testified that he didn't know how to
account for them: "She's had bruises appear for no reason. We wouldn't know how, and
~ and I couldn't say" (R. 420). Defendant denied trying to force Teri into the car (R.
421). He testified that he didn't do anything to lead anyone to think he was struggling
with her, and that the Youngs may have "misinterpreted me as - or it as a struggle" (R.
424).
Challenged Rule 404fb) Rebuttal Testimony. To rebut defendant's testimony
denying his assault or unlawful detention of Teri, the State called defendant's ex-wife,
Jan Brown. Following is part of her contested testimony:5
A.
I was being harassed [by defendant] by the phone, by drive-bys, physically.
So I didn't 5

Her entire testimony, the parties' discussion, and the trial court's ruling are in the
Addendum.
10

THE COURT: When you say "physically," ma'am, what do you mean?
THE WITNESS: Well, I was dragged by the car. I was thrown through doors.
MR. TERRY: Your Honor, I THE WITNESS: I was choked.
MR. TERRY: I object under 404, and I ask to be heard outside the presence of the
jury.
(R. 430). Trial counsel then argued that Ms. Brown's testimony of prior bad acts was
specifically prohibited since it did not fall within any of the exceptions under rule 404(b),
Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 431-32).
Trial Court's Ruling and Rationale. The trial court agreed that Ms. Brown's
testimony would not be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
or knowledge. However the trial court ruled that it was admissible to establish absence of
mistake or accident (R. 432). The judge concluded by stating,
when it was pointed out on his cross-examination by Mr. Rowe to
[defendant] that there were bruises shown in the photographs that were
taken immediately after ilie incident at Albertson's, [defendant] expressed
lack of knowledge; expressed the appearance of unknown bruises on [the
victim]. That, to me, requires — almost demands of the State to present
evidence if it has any regarding absence of mistake or accident.
Id* After hearing Ms. Brown's proffered testimony, the trial court permitted the
following additional testimony before the jury:
A.
The number of times [of physical contact between herself and
defendant] is pretty hard to count. It was often. There were several —
several that were worse than others.

11

I have been thrown through doors. Which people on other occasions
have seen the broken doors out on my patio. I still don't have the doors on
my house, to this day. I've been dragged by the car. I have been choked.
Things have been broken in my house. Bookcases knocked over. On and
on. It was constant.
(R. 435-36).
Defendant elected not to cross-examine Ms. Brown (R. 436). The State made no
mention of her testimony in closing argument (R. 444-51,462-64). There was no limiting
instruction as to her testimony, although trial counsel did not object to the proposed
instructions, (R. 442), or to the instructions as given, (R. 443,464-65), nor did he request
additional instructions. I$L6
Other facts necessary to the disposition of this case are set forth in argument
below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Prior Bad Acts - Rules 404 and 403. Evidence defendant assaulted his exwife was not offered to prove defendant's bad character or criminal disposition and was
not offered in the State's case-in-chief. It was properly admissible, in rebuttal to
defendant's own testimony related to Counts Four (assault) and Five (unlawful detention),
as proof of identity, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, and intent. Utah R. Evid
404(b).

6

See note 9 below.
12

Rule 403 provides only that certain evidence "may be excluded." Utah R. Evid.
403. Exclusion rests within the substantial discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling must
stand so long as it lies within the "limits of reasonability." The trial court's ruling
admitting the evidence was not an abuse of discretion since the evidence directly rebutted
what was defendant's only defense to the assault and unlawful detention counts: that he
was not the perpetrator and did not know who or what caused the injuries. The probative
value of this evidence was not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Indeed, since he
opened the door to its admission, defendant himself provided its probative value.
Even if it were error, under either rule 404 or 403, to admit evidence of
defendant's prior assaults on his ex-wife, it was not prejudicial. The corroborated
testimony of the victim and photographic evidence of her injuries were already before the
jury on the assault and unlawful detention counts. The State's evidence was clearly
sufficient. Defendant's testimony was implausible. Even absent the contested evidence,
there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ("Andfirs" Submission). Defendant's
counsel has submitted the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as "frivolous" and
has certified that he served a copy of the brief on defendant. Sfifi Anders v. California. 87
S.Ct. 1396 (1967); State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 1968 (Utah 1981). Def. Br. at 15-16.
13

However, defendant's counsel has made no motion to withdraw, and has failed to brief
the issue or issues defendant wanted to raise as required. Sss. Anders. 87 S.Ct. at 1400;
Clavton. 639 P.2d at 169-71: Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873, 874-75, 877-79 (Utah 1990).
This Court should direct defendant's counsel to supplement his brief so it complies with
Andsrs and its progeny. The State elects not to address ineffective assistance of trial
counsel until defendant's counsel has briefed this issue. See Clayton. 639 P.2d at 170.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT ASSAULTED HIS EX-WIFE
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO REBUT
DEFENDANTS CLAIMS THAT HE WAS NOT THE
PERPETRATOR AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT
CAUSED THE VICTIM'S INJURIES
1. Prior Bad Acts - Utah R Evid. 404(b).
The Utah appellate courts, as well as the federal courts, "interpret Rule 404(b) as
an 'inclusionary' rule." State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State
v. Tavlor. 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991)).
Thus, Rule 404 allows prior bad act evidence in a criminal trial
where it is offered to show any element of the alleged crime. Prior bad act
evidence is only excluded were the sole reason it is being offered it to prove
bad character or to show that a person acted in conformity with that
character.
O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700. In other words, if the prior bad act evidence is offered to show
an element or material fact, and not solely criminal propensity, it is admissible. Further,
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when evidence establishes elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused '"it is
admissible even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes.'"
Tavlor, 818 P.2d. at 569 (quoting State v. Jamison 767 P.2d 134,137 (Utah App. 1989)).
Utah appellate courts have often admitted evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
pursuant to rule 404(b). O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 700 (citing, e.g., State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d
291,296 (Utah 1988) (admitting evidence of sexual assault to show intent and mental
state on kidnaping charge); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069,1075 (Utah 1987) (admitting
evidence of prior forgery conviction to show identity); Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572 (admitting
evidence of prior drug conviction to show possession and common plan of distribution);
State v. MorrelL 803 P.2d 292,296 (Utah App. 1990) (admitting evidence of prior
robbery to show intent for later robbery)).
When defendant denied being the perpetrator of the victim's injuries and denied
knowing how she sustained the bruises on her arms, he raised identity, accident,
knowledge, and intent as issues. £fi£ State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922,926 (Utah App.
1994) (manslaughter defendant placed identity, intent, and lack of accident or mistake in
issue when defendant denied being the perpetrator of the victim's injuries, and argued that
the injuries might have been caused by accident). The evidence of defendant's intentional
assaults on his ex-wife properly rebutted his testimony that he caringly held the victim in
his arms while asking her if she wanted to go to the hospital, and that he was ignorant of
how the victim's arms may have been bruised. Ms. Brown's brief rebuttal testimony
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about defendant's violent behavior demonstrated that it was more likely that defendant
was the cause of the victim's injuries, that they were no accident or physiological
anomaly, that he had knowledge of how they were caused, and that defendant intended to
cause them in spite of his testimony to the contrary.

a. Identity
Mr. and Mrs. Young testified they saw a man they could not identify struggling to
push the victim into a car in the Albertson's parking lot (R. 202-207,212; 226-29). The
victim identified defendant as her attacker (R. 265-70). But defendant attacked the
victim's credibility, asserting that she was on drugs at the time (R. 404).
Defendant further testified he did not do anything to lead anyone to think he was
struggling with the victim in the parking lot, and that a witness may have
"misinterpreted" seeing a "struggle"(R. 424). Defendant also denied causing the bruises
on the victim's arms, and testified he didn't know what caused them (R. 420).
By so doing, defendant raised the issue of identity: he professed he was not the
one who caused the victim's injuries. Testimony by his former wife regarding his
assaults on her rebutted and undermined defendant's assertion since he had intentionally
injured her in the past (R. 430,435; S££ State v. Rocco- 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1990)).
Since defendant opened the door to this evidence in his case-in-chief, he cannot
now be heard to complain that the State presented it in rebuttal. Indeed, before its case-
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in-chief, the State put defendant on notice that his ex-wife "may be called in rebuttal or if
necessary" (R. 124-25).
In State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1994), the defendant argued that the
trial court erred in admitting into evidence a mug shot photograph. He claimed that the
photograph was not admissible because it brought to the jury's attention evidence of his
prior criminal activity, which is generally inadmissible under rule 404(a). The State
responded that the photograph was properly admitted under rule 404(b) because it proved
identity and because it was admitted only after defendant elicited testimony regarding its
existence. This Court agreed that a defendant cannot on appeal attack the admission of
evidence when "he himself opened the door to its introduction on cross-examination."7
882 P.2d at 154 (citing State v. Barney. 681 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Utah 1984)). Accord State
v. Pacheco. 778 P.2d 26,30 (Utah App. 1989) (acknowledging "the admission of
improper photographs has been held to not constitute reversible error where defendants
opened the door for admission").
As this Court wrote in Ramos,
Normally, we would further consider whether it was admissible after the
balancing required under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
However, because we conclude that defendant elicited the introduction of
the photograph and cannot therefore challenge its admission on appeal, we

7

Trial defense counsel in Ramos elicited testimony from a State's witness that
led to introduction of the photograph. In this case, defendant's own testimony opened the
door to the prior bad acts evidence.
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do not undertake a Rule 403 analysis and do not consider whether the
photograph was unduly prejudicial
848P.2dn.2atl55.
Federal case law similarly prohibits a defendant from challenging the admission of
prior bad acts evidence when he or she was responsible for its introduction. For example,
in United States v. Guinn. 454 F.2d 29,37 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 407 U.S. 911,92 S. Ct
2437 (1972), identification was at issue, and the defendant cross-examined a witness
about the use of photographs for identification. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded:
Although, under certain circumstances, admission of suggestive
photographs tending to allude to a criminal record or bad character, might
well result in reversible error, this is not such a case. Here, the admission of
the photographs will not result in reversal because the door for the
admission was opened by the defendants
It was proper for the
government then, on redirect, to introduce the photographs to clear up the
doubt as to the identification.
Id. (emphasis added).
b. Acgidfflt Qt qiisfckg
Defendant raised accident or mistake when he had no explanation for the bruises
on the victim's arms, and testified that she had suffered unexplained bruises in the past,
implying that the cause of the injuries was accidental or some sort of physiological
anomaly (R. 420). Testimony by defendant's former wife that hefrequentlyand
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intentionally caused her physical injury was properly admitted as fair rebuttal to
defendant's implicit claims of accident and mistake (R. 430,435).
"Evidence which shows that an event was not caused by accident tends to show
that the event was caused intentionally." Teuscher. 883 P.2d at 926 (quoting People v.
Brown. 199 Ill.App.2d 860,145 IlLDec. 841, 851, 557 N.E.2d 611,621, appeal denied.
133 I11.2d 561,149 IlLDec. 326, 561 N.E.2d 696 (1990)). "By maintaining an accident
defense, defendant also placed intent in issue." Teuscher. 883 P.2d at 926.

c. Knowledge and intent
The State presented photographic and testimonial evidence related to bruises on
the victim's arms (State's Ex. 13; R. 280-81). Defendant raised knowledge and intent as
an issue in his defense when he testified he put his arms around the victim's waist to
comfort her, leaned against the car, and talked to her, asking if she wanted to go to the
hospital, and when he denied knowing how the bruises on the victim's arms were caused,
and specifically denied that he had caused them (R. 406,420). The testimony of
defendant's former wife properly rebutted defendant's professed ignorance of the cause
of the victim's injuries (R. 430,435).
In State v. Brown. 577 P.2d 135,136 (Utah 1978), the supreme court held that
"[i]n testifying that he was innocently involved," the defendant "directly put in issue his
own knowledge and intent" Thus evidence of an alleged prior, unrelated offense
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involving similar criminal activity by the defendant was properly admitted as evidence of
defendant's knowledge and intent.
As this Court noted in O'NeiL the federal case of United States v. Martino. 759
F.2d 998 (2nd Cir. 1985) is also instructive:8
In Martino- the defendant was arrested at the site of an illegal drug sale. He
claimed that although he knew another participant, it was a coincidence he
was at the site of the transaction. In effect, he asserted a "mere presence"
defense in an attempt to raise doubts about the elements of knowledge and
intent required for conviction. The trial court allowed into evidence a
juvenile drug conviction from eleven years earlier as "similar act evidence
bearing on the issues of [defendant's] knowledge and intent." I$L at 1002.
Affirming the trial court's ruling, the Second Circuit held the defendant "by
his defense, placed in issue the question of knowledge and intent as to his
association" with the other drug sale participants. IJL at 1005. "Thus, the
government in an effort to meet its burden of proof was certainly entitled to
offer this prior similar act evidence to aid the jury in assessing [defendant's]
intentions." Id* See also State v. MorrelL 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990)
(finding evidence of prior robbery admissible to infer intent).
Q3l£il,848P.2dat700.
2. Prior Bad Acts - Rule 403. As noted above, since defendant himself opened
the door to introduction of the prior bad act testimony, this Court need not apply a rule
403 balancing test. $££ Ramos, 848 P.2d n.2 at 155. In other words, defendant himself
gave the evidence probative value by his own defense, and cannot now claim unfair
prejudice.

8

"Utah courts look 'to the interpretations of the federal rules [of evidence] by the
federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah Rules/ State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325,
1333-34 (Utah 1986)." O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 700.
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Assuming this Court disagrees that defendant opened the door and chooses to
apply the probative value versus unfair prejudice balancing test, the trial court's ruling
whether to exclude evidence under rule 403 is subject to substantial appellate deference
and must stand so long as it lies within the "limits of reasonability."
The trial court acted well within the limits of reasonability by allowing evidence of
defendant's prior bad acts. The charged offense of assault and the prior assaults were
similar (defendant threw his ex-wife through doors; he tried to force the victim in this
case through a car door). Sfifi Teuscher. 883 P.2d at 926-28 (prior assaults against other
victims admissible). The interval between the offenses was short (defendant was
divorced by his former wife in December 1992, and committed the offense of assault in
this case in October 1994. Sfifi O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 701 (incidents three years apart
admissible). Although the State had other evidence of identity, absence of mistake or
accident, and knowledge and intent from other witnesses, that is not a bar to the
admissibility of this rebuttal testimony. £fi£ State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,296 (Utah
1988) (other bad acts evidence admissible even where prosecution presented other
evidence of defendant's intent). Finally, there is no basis to assume that the jury was any
more prejudiced against defendant based on Ms. Brown's brief testimony regarding
defendant's prior aggressive behavior thanfromthe testimony of the State's witnesses
about the charged offenses. Indeed, their testimony occupies nearly 200 pages of
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typewritten transcript while Ms. Brown's entire contested testimony occupies less than 20
lines.
3. Prior Bad Acts - No Prejudicial Error. "Improperly admitted evidence
requires reversal of a conviction only where we conclude there is a 'reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 699 (quoting
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,140 (Utah 1992), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993)). Even assuming this Court found any error under rules 404 or 403, it was not
prejudicial since it was not outcome-determinative. The State's evidence was clearly
sufficient. The corroborated testimony of the victim and photographic evidence of her
injuries were already before the jury on Counts Four and Five. Even absent the contested
evidence, the jury would still have convicted defendant on these two counts. There was
no "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result absent the admission of the prior bad
acts evidence." State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424,431 (Utah 1988).9
POINT II
COUNSEL'S PARTIAL ANDERS SUBMISSION
WARRANTS NO FURTHER RESPONSE
Defendant's counsel has submitted the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as
"frivolous" and has certified that he served a copy of the brief on defendant. £fi£ Anders
9

Although there was no limiting instruction, a failure to give a cautionary
instruction, particularly where trial counsel fails to object or request additional
instructions, does not constitute prejudicial error. £fi£ State v. Smith- 700 P.2d 1106
(Utah 1985).
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v. California. 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967); State v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 1968 (Utah 1981). Def.
Br. at 15-16. However, defendant's counsel has made no motion to withdraw and, other
than asserting that he "cannot, in good faith, present an argument on the issue... which
would not be frivolous" (Def. Br. at 15), has failed to brief the issue or issues defendant
wanted to raise as case law requires. Sfifi Anders. 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Clayton. 639 P.2d at
169-71; Dunn v.Cook. 791 P.2d 873,874-75, 877-79 (Utah 1990). This Court should
direct defendant's counsel to supplement his brief so it complies with Anders, Clayton,
and Dunn. The State elects not to address ineffective assistance of trial counsel until
defendant's counsel has briefed this issue. See Clayton. 639 P.2d at 170.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The State respectfully requests oral argument to answer any questions or concerns
the Court may have.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 Kf day of July, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SARNARD N. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum

314

Q.

Isn 't that why she was afraid of you?

A.

No, it's not.

Q.

And isn't that why she attempted to get out of

the vehicle, and you 1 would not let her get out of the
vehicle, because you <
wanted to control her?

A.

No, it's not.
MR. ROWE:

Z have no further questions.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Terry?

MR. TERRY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, sir.

You may

step down.
Do you have any other witnesses, Counsel?

MR. TERRY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

The defendant having

rested, any rebuttal, Mr. Rowe?

MR. ROWE: Yes.

I'd like to call Jan Campbell

to the stand.
THE COURT: All right.

Let's ask Jan Campbell

to come in •

She has not been sworn; is that correct,
Counsel?

MR. ROWE:

She has not.

She was not here when

the others were sworn .
THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROWE: She has been out in the lobby.
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MR. TERRY: May counsel approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

Certainly, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court
and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of
the jury, which was not recorded.)
THE COURT: Janet Campbell, would you come in
front of these tables, face the clerk and raise your right
hand and be sworn. That's fine right there, ma'am.
Thank you.

Go ahead.

JAM BROWN,
the witness herein, having been
first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:
THE WITNESS:

I do.

THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am.

Would you have a

seat here.
Go ahead.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROWE:
Q.

Would you state your name and where you live.

&.

Jan Brown.

St. George.

THE COURT: Used to be Campbell, ma'am?
THE WITNESS: Used to be Campbell.
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THE COURT: All right.

We have misnamed you.

I'm sorry.
Go ahead, Counsel.
Q.

BY MR. ROWE: And are you acquainted with

Jeffery Campbell?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And how are you acquainted with Mr. Campbell?

A*

I was married to him until December of '92.

Q.

And both —

during the period of your marriage

and since that time, are you -- have you maintained contact
with Mr. Campbell?

Have you known him and his whereabouts

and friends and mutual acquaintances?
A.

We have had contact several times since the

divorce.
Q.

And with regard to Mr. Campbell's dealings with

yourself and other women that he has had relationships, are
you familiar in any respect with those types of
relationships?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you aware of any reputation Mr. Campbell may

have with regard to his dealings with women that he has
close personal relationships with?
MR. TERRY:
relevance.

Your Honor, I object as to

And also I think we're getting into —
MR. ROWE:

Your Honor, he placed his credibility
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in issue when he took the stand, and he's made
representations as to his nonviolent nature.
THE COURT: Well, I didn't hear any reputation
testimony, Counsel.
MR. TERRY;

That's correct, Your Honor.

We're

getting into the 404 evidence that I don't believe is
appropriate.
THE COURT: Hang on just a second and let me get
the right rule in front of me.
Counsel, I am not going to allow this testimony
to come in as character testimony.

But I call your

attention to Rule 404 Sub (b) if you have specific
instances with respect to this witness.
MR. ROWE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll limit it

to that, then.
Q.

Miss Campbell, during the course of your

relationship with Mr. Campbell, were there occasions when
he ~

Mr. Campbell and yourself had disagreements between

each other in the course of your marriage?
A*

Yes, sir.

Q.

During that period of time, did you feel it

incumbent upon yourself to take action in order to protect
yourself from Mr. Campbell in the form of seeking
protective orders and things like that?
MR. TERRY:

Your Honor, objection.
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and

~
THE COURT:

The action she took, Counsel, is not

Sustained.

Focus on the events that caused the

relevant.

problems, and what happened between the two of them.
Q.

BY MR. ROWE: Well, did you seek help during the

course of your marriage because of your relationship with
Mr. Campbell?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what was the nature of the instances and

—

which you felt you needed assistance outside in your
marriage to deal with Mr. Campbell?
A.

I was being harassed by the phone, by drive-bys,

physically.

So I didn't

~

THE COURT: When you say "physically," ma'am,
what do you mean?
THE WITNESS:

Physically.

THE COURT: What did Mr. Campbell do that you
characterize as physical?
THE WITNESS: Well, I was dragged by the car.
was thrown through doors.
MR. TERRY:

Your Honor, I

THE WITNESS:
MR. TERRY:

~

I was choked.

I object under 404, and I ask to be

heard outside the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: Members of the Jury, I'm going to
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excuse you briefly*

As you leave the courtroom, remember,

don't discuss the case among yourselves or form or express
any opinion.

Don't get too comfortable in the jury room,

because you're going to be back in a hurry.
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court
and counsel in open court out of the hearing of
the jury, which was recorded as follows:)
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bailiff.
The record should reflect the jury has departed,
and the door is shut.
Your objection to 404, Mr. Terry?
MR. TERRY:

It's under 404(b), Your Honor.

submit that this evidence —
trial up to now.

I

I mean this has been a clean

But I submit that this evidence is being

introduced specifically for the purpose of showing -- of
bringing in bad acts ~

alleged bad acts to prove my ~

my

client's character in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith, which is specifically prohibited by
404(b).
I don't think that the State can put on this
evidence under the exceptions of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or accident with this witness.

They may have been

able to do that with Teri LaCorti, Your Honor, but I submit
to the Court that this witness bringing in these alleged
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bad acts from a previous relationship do not fall in any of
those exceptions and only prejudice this jury.
THE COURT:

Counsel, motive, maybe•

Opportunity

and intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, I agree with
you.

Identity, I agree with you.

But when it was pointed

out on his cross-examination by Mr. Rowe to Mr. Campbell
that there were bruises shown in the photographs that were
taken immediately after the incident in Albertson's,
Mr. Campbell expressed lack of knowledge; expressed the
appearance of unknown bruises on Miss LaCorti.
me, requires —

That, to

almost demands of the State to present

evidence if it has any regarding absence of mistake or
accident.
MR. TERRY:

And I think that they could do that

with her or with some physician, but not his ex-wife.
THE COURT:

I think to the contrary, Counsel.

Ma'am, were you giving us a laundry list of
occurrences of physical violence between yourself and
Mr. Campbell during the course of your marriage?
Let me ask you specifically tell us that again
on the record before the jury comes back in so I'll know
what your full testimony will be with regard to instances
of physical violence —

Mr. Campbell against yourself

—

during the course of your marriage or your separation or
divorce. And if it's something that's after the separation
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or divorce, please note ~

give me an idea of what that

is.
THE WITNESS: After we were divorced, there was
the harassment.
telephone.

It wasn't exactly physical, it was the

And I did file separate charges on that.
THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: And driving by and that kind of

thing.
THE COURT:

Forget about the telephone, then.

Let's talk about physical occurrences between yourself and
Mr. Campbell during the course of the marriage.
What happened to you where he physically caused
you harm?
THE WITNESS: Well, I did end up in the hospital
once when I was dragged by the car.

I have been physically

thrown up against a wall, choked, thrown through doors.
THE COURT: How were you dragged by the car?
How did that happen?
THE WITNESS: Well, I was trying to stop the
car, is what I was trying to do.

Because he had put my

daughter into the car. And it was three o'clock in the
morning, and he was drunk. And so I was extremely upset,
because my daughter was now in the car, because she woke up
because we were fighting.

And he put her in the car. And

I tried to stop the car. And I said, "Fine.
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car, but I want my kid out." And he wouldn't, so I kept on
hanging on the car. And he floored it and gunned it. And
I couldn't hang on anymore, so

~

THE COURT: Which portion of the car were you
hanging onto?
THE WITNESS:

I —

the driver's side door.

THE COURT: All right. And how far were you
drug?
THE WITNESS:
cold.

I have no idea.

I got knocked

And I woke up about Bluff Street, and he was taking

me to the hospital.
THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Rowe, anything you

want to follow up in terms of evidence before you argue
your position?

I think you know where the Court stands on

it.
MR. ROWE:

Not as far as evidence (Inaudible).

I agree with the Court. And I would just say that any —
you know, if there's any concern here, it's to —

it's the

probativeness versus the prejudice.
And I would say that in addition to inadvertence
or mistake or accident, Mr. Campbell, by characterizing
what otherwise witnesses character as violent behavior as
nonviolent behavior, he's interjected the basis as well for
this testimony.
THE COURT: All right.

And I agree with you,
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Counsel.
Mr. Bailiff, would you return the jury back into
the courtroom.
Mr. Terry, in order to avoid any problems, you
have a continuing objection to all testimony of this kind.
MR. TERRY: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had
in open court, in the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

Thank you, Members of the Jury.

The

record will reflect that the members of the jury have
returned, and they are all now seated in the jury box.
Mr. Rowe, please continue.
MR. ROWE:
Q.

Your next question?

Thank you.

Miss Campbell, I believe you were describing

incidents where physical contact between you and
Mr. Campbell had occurred.

Would you complete telling the

jury the number of times and what type of physical contact
Mr. Campbell had with you.
A.

The number of times is pretty hard to count.

was often.

It

There were several -- several that were worse

than others.
I have been thrown through doors. Which people
on other occasions have seen the broken doors out on my
patio.
day.

I still don't have the doors on my house, to this

I've been dragged by the car.

I have been choked.
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Things have been broken in my house. Bookcases knocked
over.

On and on.

Q.

Okay.

It was constant.
Thank you. With regard to —

do you know

of Shelly and Robert McKevitt?
A*

I've never met them.

Q.

Do you know who they are?

A.

I know who they are.

Q.

And didn't you, in talking to me earlier today,

indicate that they had removed themselves from where they
used to live?
A.

The place of business that they had on Sunset

has been closed.
Q.

Do you know how long that's been closed?

A.

Probably December.
MR. ROWE:

I'm not quite sure on that.

I have no further questions of this

witness.
THE COURT: Mr. Terry, any cross?
MR. TERRY:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, ma'am.

You

may step down.
Any other rebuttal, Mr. Rowe?
MR. ROWE:

Yes. Just briefly.

THE BAILIFF:

Teri LaCorti.

Your Honor, can she be released?

THE COURT: May this witness be excused?
MR. ROWS:

I ask that she be allowed to stay or
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go, as she chooses.
THE COURT: You may stay in the courtroom if you
want, ma'am.

Or you may leave.

Okay.

It's up to you.

Miss LaCorti, would you come forward and

take the witness stand again, ma'am,

TERZ LACORTI,
the witness herein, having been
previously duly sworn, was examined
further and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROWE:
Q.

Miss LaCorti, you've previously been sworn.
Do you recall that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've heard Mr. Campbell's testimony now

regarding the events that —

you heard him testifying that

the belongings in the car were a number of different
people's; is that correct?
A.

No, it's not.

Q.

Who did the belongings in the car belong to?

A.

Mine and his.

Q.

And you heard him say that the drugs in the car,

he was unaware of.
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